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The strain of international commitments has led to the erosion
of democratic politics in Greece.
May 14 2012
More than a week after Greece’s elections, a political stalemate still stands, with no party able
to form a stable government. Nikitas Konstantinidis argues that the demands placed on
Greece from international organisations such as the IMF and the EU have strained its
political system to a near breaking point. The solutions to Greece’s crisis now rest with Paris,
Berlin and Brussels rather than Athens.
The results of the May 6 parliamentary elections in Greece have heralded the end of an era in
its post-dictatorial democratic politics (metapolitefsi), which were characterized by the
alternation in power of two catch-all parties, cartelization of government, and heavy statism.
The Greek people have expressed a strong aversion to the established political elites of the center-left
PASOK and the center-right New Democracy (whose respective vote shares added up to 32%, less than half
of their sum total in the 2009 elections). The rise of SYRIZA, a pre-electoral coalition of left-wing movements,
has been the major story so far. However, the existing electoral system – designed by New Democracy in
2006 as a buttress for an entrenched two-party system and stable single-party government – has led to a
significant distortion of the people’s democratic will in terms of the translation of vote shares into seats (New
Democracy gained more than a third of the seats with only 19% of the vote).
Recent developments in Greek politics are giving us a glimpse into its future. The Greek political system has
been strained beyond its breaking point by the demands of its international commitments. As a result of
increasing fiscal and supply-side conditionality and complex policy interdependence, there is less room for
domestic political maneuvering. The scope for unilateral political action has shrunk to such an extent that
political rhetoric has been greatly polarized around stark political dilemmas between pro- and anti-
Europeanism, pro- and anti- austerity, populism and realism, democracy and technocracy. The electoral shift
towards extremist and radical parties (e.g., the extreme right-wing Golden Dawn party witnessed a meteoric
rise in its vote share from less than 1% to 7%) provides clear evidence of the radicalization of Greek politics,
a natural consequence of the unprecedented economic recession (the country now experiencing its fifth
successive year of negative growth).
The last parliamentary elections in 2009
took place at a time when the full extent of the crisis had not been widely publicized; the Papandreou
government had not been voted into office with an explicit austerity mandate. As a result, it resorted to fickle
policies and sporadic measures of fiscal adjustment, plagued by a distinct lack of democratic legitimacy and
true political will for reform. The waning two-party system was not able to overcome the opposition of deep-
rooted institutional actors, client groups, and favored constituencies eager to defend the status quo till its last
throes. This paralyzing misalignment of the political system with popular will and the need for a renewed
political agenda had to be brought to light and democratically expressed at the ballot.
However, the pro-European reflexes of the Greek electorate cannot be refuted by the latest electoral results.
The overall commitment to the Union remains a mainstream political orientation in the country (the Greek
Communist Party and the Golden Dawn party being the only ones openly calling for exit from Europe).
Impending electoral reforms aimed towards higher proportionality and the democratic purge of entrenched
political elites (around 180 out of 300 recently elected MPs are first-timers) seem to usher in a new era of
ideologically compact parties, unstable post-electoral coalitions, and ill-defined coalition pacts. The specter of
continued ungovernability will tend to force parties into uneasy coalitions with weak reformist mandates, and
we can only speculate on Greece’s capacity for further reforms.
The polarizing rhetoric of the latest electoral contest gave vent to much popular frustration over a range of
issues, such as debt restructuring, unemployment, welfare, and immigration policy, which now fall beyond
Greece’s problem-solving capacity. All mainstream party platforms evoked the use of supranational policy
instruments and rested on dubious assumptions about the outcomes of future intergovernmental
negotiations. The people were thus made aware of the limits of their national democratic system in providing
sound and credible answers to the hardships of their everyday life. Such deep frustration gave rise to social
unrest, civil disobedience, and of late political anti-systemic radicalization.
Greece may thus be viewed as a harbinger of the gradual erosion and delegitimization of national-level
democracy in the face of unfettered, crisis-ridden globalization. This vicious cycle of social unrest and political
instability may only be broken by agreements and initiatives at the European level, which will essentially
change the rules of the game and alter the contours of political debate. By further centralizing policy domains
that currently reside within the purview of national governments (immigration, taxation, unemployment,
welfare policy etc.), one may thus pull the carpet underneath populist and radical rhetoric and limit its appeal
to small pockets of society. All the tools and answers at this time of crisis lie in Berlin, Paris, and Brussels.
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